The Mandelson-Epstein affair: a national security perspective

The official line is simple enough. A former Cabinet minister maintained an ill-advised friendship with a convicted sex offender. He shared some emails he shouldn’t have. He’s now facing a criminal investigation. Case closed - or at least, case proceeding through proper channels.

This narrative obscures more than it explains.

On 3 February 2026, the Metropolitan Police opened a criminal investigation into “a 72-year-old man, a former government minister, for misconduct in public office offences”. The investigation follows the US Department of Justice’s release of over three million pages of Epstein-related documents - and a direct referral from the UK government itself. What the documents appear to show is not a careless friendship but something closer to a sustained intelligence compromise at the heart of the British state during one of its most vulnerable moments.

Mandelson maintains his innocence. He has questioned document authenticity, described Epstein as a “master manipulator” who deceived him, and insisted he has “absolutely no recollection” of receiving $75,000 in alleged payments. These denials deserve examination. He remains innocent until proven guilty. But the documentary record raises questions that cannot be wished away through expressions of regret.

What the documents show

The mainstream focus has been on the salacious details. What matters more is the systematic pattern.

On 13 June 2009, Nick Butler - a special adviser to Gordon Brown - circulated a confidential memo proposing £20 billion in asset sales. Mandelson forwarded it to Epstein: “Interesting note that’s gone to the PM”. Four months later, the government announced £16 billion in planned disposals.

In August 2009, confidential exchanges between Shriti Vadera and Jeremy Heywood concerning bank lending were forwarded to Epstein within four seconds of receipt. When forwarding such documents, Mandelson allegedly developed a catchphrase: “Please protect” - seemingly revealing awareness the material should not circulate beyond government channels.

On 9 May 2010, Epstein messaged: “Sources tell me 500 b euro bailout, almost complete.” Mandelson confirmed it would be announced “tonight”. The €500 billion European stabilisation package was announced the next day, sparking a euro rally.

After the 2010 election, Mandelson allegedly emailed Epstein that he had “finally got him to go today” - informing the convicted sex offender of Gordon Brown’s imminent resignation before public announcement.

Documents also show Mandelson appeared to reveal the existence of a secret tunnel between 10 Downing Street and the Ministry of Defence - classified infrastructure information.

The lobbying that no one’s calling lobbying

In December 2009, Chancellor Alistair Darling announced a 50% “super tax” on banker bonuses. Epstein asked whether it might be amended. Mandelson’s alleged reply: “Trying hard to amend as I explained to Jes last night. Treasury digging in but I am on case”. “Jes” was Jes Staley, then a senior JP Morgan executive - later fined over £1 million and banned from senior financial roles after regulators determined he had “recklessly” misled them about his Epstein relationship.

Then the escalation. Epstein asked whether Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan’s CEO, should call Darling. Mandelson’s response: “Yes and mildly threaten”.

The implications bear restating. A senior British Cabinet minister was apparently advising a foreign financier that America’s largest bank should pressure the Chancellor to reverse government policy. This was not lobbying through proper channels. This was a serving minister allegedly coordinating coercive tactics against his own colleague on behalf of foreign financial interests - routed through a convicted sex offender.

The advice was followed. Dimon called Darling and threatened to scrap London headquarters expansion plans. We know this because Darling recorded it in his memoir.

Documents suggest Epstein was providing detailed drafting suggestions on financial services legislation. A convicted sex offender, it appears, enjoyed back-channel influence over British banking regulation.

What Mandelson admits, and what he hedges

Mandelson acknowledges his partner, Reinaldo Avila da Silva, received payments from Epstein, including £10,000 for an “osteopathy course” in 2009 whilst Mandelson served as Business Secretary. He characterises this as an “educational bursary”. In one email, Mandelson asked Epstein whether he had “permanently stopped the Reinaldo sub,” adding he might have to put him to work “on the streets”.

The $75,000 in alleged direct payments is disputed. Bank statements appear to show three $25,000 transfers between 2003-2004. A spokesperson stated neither Mandelson nor his husband “has any record or recollection of receiving payments” and cannot confirm document authenticity.

Mark the hedging. “No recollection of receiving” is not “did not receive”. Most people told they’d accepted $75,000 from a convicted sex offender would deny it flatly. The formulation leaves considerable room for manoeuvre. Even Mandelson’s defence stops short of unequivocal denial.

Yet his prior admissions remain damaging. In October 2010 - after Epstein’s conviction - Mandelson emailed seeking advice on purchasing a £2 million Rio apartment. He described Epstein as his “chief life adviser”. In June 2008, the day before Epstein reported to jail, Mandelson wrote: “I think the world of you, and I feel hopeless and furious about what has happened... Your friends stay with you and love you”.

The pattern in plain sight

This isn’t Mandelson’s first entanglement with controversial foreign wealth - and some observers have been documenting it for years.

In 2008, he faced scrutiny over Oleg Deripaska, the Russian aluminium oligarch. As EU Trade Commissioner, shortly after meeting Deripaska aboard his £80 million yacht, Mandelson signed off on removing a 14.9% tariff on Russian aluminium foil.

The China dimension may prove more consequential. From 2015 to 2023, Mandelson served as honorary president of the Great Britain China Centre, leading an organisation that received over £300,000 annually in government funding whilst organising political meetings with Beijing. In June 2023, he met Liu Jianchao, head of the CCP’s International Department - who previously ran Operation Fox Hunt, Beijing’s programme for pursuing dissidents abroad. The FBI has charged eight people connected to it.

His lobbying firm, Global Counsel, worked for TikTok, Shein and Chinese state enterprises. A British court judgment identified the 48 Group Club, of which Mandelson is a member, as potentially subject to “leverage for political interference purposes by the Chinese State.” A dossier compiled by the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, showing “multiple instances of Chinese Communist Party figures praising or thanking” Mandelson, was sent to the FBI.

MI6 reportedly failed to clear Mandelson for the ambassadorship, citing concerns over both Epstein and Chinese business links. The appointment proceeded anyway.

One such relationship might be poor judgment. Three suggests something systematic - and the security services knew it.

Epstein’s intelligence connections

The provenance of Epstein’s wealth has never been satisfactorily explained. His network touched institutions that should have known better - and in many cases, did know better.

Multiple intelligence commentators allege Epstein ran a classic honeytrap operation. Alexander Acosta, the US Attorney who negotiated Epstein’s lenient 2008 plea deal, reportedly told Trump administration officials he “was told Epstein ‘belonged to intelligence’ and to leave it alone”.

The Israeli connection runs through Ghislaine Maxwell’s father, Robert Maxwell - confirmed Mossad asset. The Russian dimension: released files contain over 9,000 references to Moscow and 1,056 to Putin. Cameras in every room. Maxwell photographing everyone who came through.

Emily Thornberry noted the tunnel revelation was “shocking and unforgivable by itself”. If Epstein functioned as an access agent for foreign intelligence, material shared with him didn’t stay private - it reached hostile state apparatus.

The institutions knew. JPMorgan Chase flagged over $1 billion in suspicious transactions tied to Epstein, filing suspicious activity reports as early as 2002. The bank maintained the relationship regardless. When JPMorgan finally severed ties in 2013, Deutsche Bank stepped in, opening more than 40 accounts for Epstein and his entities despite his status as a registered sex offender. The German lender was later fined $150 million by New York regulators, who found it had cleared payments from Epstein to accounts in Russia held by women with “Eastern European surnames” - supposedly for school tuition.

MIT’s Media Lab accepted $850,000 from Epstein over fifteen years, with senior staff deliberately concealing the donations by listing them as anonymous. Director Joi Ito referred to Epstein internally as “Voldemort” and “he who shall not be named”. When the relationship became public in 2019, Ito resigned. Bill Gates met Epstein multiple times between 2011 and 2014, including at Epstein’s Manhattan townhouse and on his private jet, before the relationship apparently cooled. Gates has since described the meetings as “a huge mistake”. 

American presidents. Silicon Valley billionaires. Wall Street institutions. British royalty. Senior government figures. The common thread is not that these individuals necessarily committed crimes - many are named in documents without any wrongdoing alleged - but that Epstein accumulated access on a scale that defies ordinary explanation.

Given the British public’s already dim view of the establishment, this affair will only deepen the cynicism. The question many are now asking is uncomfortable but unavoidable: was Epstein an aberration - or does his operation reveal something endemic about how elite power actually works?

Investigative journalist Vicky Ward noted the irony: despite files implicating powerful figures across the Atlantic, “the most devastating details so far are about the British establishment.” Epstein claimed he “managed money for the Queen.” It seemed typical exaggeration. The released documents appear to suggest otherwise. Whatever the truth of royal financial dealings, Epstein was enmeshed in the finances of the Queen’s second son and former daughter-in-law - and enjoyed extraordinary access to senior government figures.

The man who traded on proximity to power genuinely had it.

When vetting was overruled

The security services apparently tried to prevent what occurred. They were overruled.

Civil servants handling TOP SECRET material undergo Developed Vetting - deliberately intrusive, designed to surface any vulnerability. Every aspect undergoes scrutiny: finances, relationships, sexual conduct, online activity. The premise is simple: better that British intelligence knows your secrets than a foreign power discovers them first.

Ministers are different. They’re not usually subjected to formal vetting. Their access flows from holding office. The constitutional logic appears sound: elected representatives derive authority from voters, not clearance certificates.

Appointed positions trigger formal vetting. Ambassadors require Developed Vetting. Security concerns can be identified, documented, placed on record.

They can also be ignored. The PM assesses suitability before vetting begins. Political judgement takes precedence.

In September 2025, security concerns surfaced during Mandelson’s vetting: relationships with Epstein and Chinese interests. The appointment was announced before vetting concluded.

Business Secretary Peter Kyle admitted “political considerations” about Mandelson’s “singular talents” led the government to judge “the risk... was worth the risk”. They acknowledged the risk. They proceeded anyway.

Thornberry’s Foreign Affairs Committee sought to interview Mandelson beforehand. They were denied.

Mandelson lasted seven months. Bloomberg published emails on 10 September 2025 showing post-conviction support for Epstein. He was dismissed the next morning.

Gordon Brown revealed in February 2026 he’d contacted the Cabinet Secretary about Mandelson-Epstein concerns in September 2025 - yet that inquiry “uncovered no significant findings”. Either vetting failed to surface readily available information, or political actors chose to proceed regardless.

Neither explanation is reassuring.

What the police investigation could examine - and what it won't

The Met’s announcement tells us less about likely charges than about the investigation’s current scope. Misconduct in public office functions as a holding charge - broad enough to avoid public alarm whilst evidence is reviewed, narrow enough to signal restraint. It says nothing about final charging decisions.

More substantive charges appear plausible. If the forwarded documents carried security classification - and Downing Street has acknowledged that ‘official handling safeguards’ were ‘compromised’ - then the Official Secrets Acts would be the natural framework. For conduct occurring in 2008-2010, prosecutors would need to apply the law as it stood at the time. Section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911, covering espionage-related offences, carried a maximum of fourteen years imprisonment; the Official Secrets Act 1989 criminalises unauthorised disclosure of specified categories of information with a maximum of two years.

It is worth noting that Parliament has since recognised the inadequacy of these penalties. The National Security Act 2023, which came into force in December 2023, replaced the espionage provisions of the 1911 Act with a new offence of ‘obtaining or disclosing protected information’ carrying a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. That Act cannot apply retrospectively to Mandelson’s alleged conduct. But its existence highlights a legislative judgment that the old regime - under which any prosecution would proceed - was insufficiently robust to address modern espionage threats.

The distinction matters more than it might appear. An Official Secrets investigation would require examining whether classified material reached foreign intelligence services, what damage resulted, who else may have been involved. Uncomfortable questions about institutional failure and foreign penetration would follow. A misconduct investigation can be scoped more narrowly: did a minister improperly share government communications? The former implicates systems. The latter confines blame to one individual’s judgment.

Yet the choice of misconduct in public office may also present prosecutorial challenges that cut the other way. As a general rule, specific statutory offences - which turn on evidence of a particular act at a specific time - are easier to prove than broad course-of-conduct charges. Misconduct in public office requires establishing an ‘extended narrative’ of culpable behaviour that fell so far below the standards expected as to abuse public trust. Defence counsel would have ample opportunity to deflect and distract a jury’s attention from such a diffuse case. A defendant with Mandelson’s political experience and communication skills would be well-positioned to exploit this.

By contrast, a charge under the Official Secrets Acts would focus on discrete acts of disclosure at identified moments. The prosecution’s task would be narrower, though the applicable test depends on which Act is engaged. Under the Official Secrets Act 1989 - which covers unauthorised disclosure of protected categories of information - prosecutors must prove disclosure without lawful authority and, for most categories, that the disclosure was damaging. Under Section 1 of the 1911 Act - the espionage provision - the test is more demanding: prosecutors must establish that the accused acted ‘for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State’ and that the information was ‘useful to an enemy’. Proving this purpose and the enemy-utility requirement presents evidential challenges (see out article on the Chinagate debacle), but the overall case architecture would be more focused than the diffuse narrative required for misconduct in public office.

Then there is the market dimension. Did advance information provided to Epstein - who serviced major investment institutions including JP Morgan - contribute to market movements during 2008-2010? If so, does criminal liability extend beyond disclosure offences to market manipulation? These questions fall entirely outside the scope of misconduct in public office. They would be central to any Financial Conduct Authority investigation. No such investigation has been announced.

The Prime Minister has committed to releasing documents related to Mandelson’s appointment, with the caveat that material jeopardising national security or diplomatic relations will be withheld. Sensitive documents go to the Intelligence and Security Committee rather than into public view. This creates an obvious constraint: if the most damaging material - evidence of foreign intelligence involvement, market manipulation, broader institutional complicity - is withheld on security grounds, the investigation’s findings may never achieve full transparency. Regardless of what investigators actually uncover.

Gordon Brown’s decision to lodge a separate complaint signals something. A former Prime Minister with direct knowledge of the alleged conduct would have no need to file independently if the government’s referral were comprehensive. His separate action implies either that he possesses information beyond what Downing Street submitted, or that he lacks confidence the official investigation will pursue all relevant questions. Possibly both.

The terms of reference remain unpublished. What the investigation is authorised to examine - and what it is implicitly prevented from examining - will determine whether this produces accountability or manages political embarrassment. The framing suggests the latter is not being left to chance.

Why this is worse than Profumo

Britain hasn’t seen a scandal of this magnitude since 1963. But everyone’s drawing the wrong parallel.

Profumo wasn’t damaging because of sex. It was what the sex revealed: a governing class operating under different rules, dishonest, complacent. War Secretary John Profumo lied to Parliament. That lie crystallised years of building suspicion. It accelerated the collapse of public deference.

The Epstein files threaten something similar - but in an environment with far less trust to lose. Where Profumo involved lying about a personal relationship, allegations against Mandelson concern something more serious: a Cabinet minister allegedly providing running commentary on government’s most sensitive deliberations to a foreign financier and convicted child sex offender.

Public trust in the political class has rarely been more fragile. Democratic institutions face sustained pressure from populist forces exploiting precisely the cynicism scandals like this fuel. The 1960s governing class enjoyed a cushion of residual deference. That cushion no longer exists. The consequences may prove more corrosive than Profumo - not because conduct is worse, but because the institutional fabric it damages is already threadbare.

The damage done

“My best pal.” “Chief life adviser.” “Please protect.”

These are Mandelson’s own words for his relationship with Epstein. During that friendship, he occupied some of the most sensitive positions in the British state. He apparently forwarded confidential documents. He lobbied on banking policy at Epstein’s request. He advised that America’s largest bank should pressure the Chancellor. His partner received money.

And then Keir Starmer made him Ambassador to the United States.

The presumption of innocence demands we await the investigation’s outcome. Legal obstacles to prosecution are substantial. Document authenticity remains contested.

But even accepting only what Mandelson admits - the maintained friendship, the partner’s payments, the “misguided” emails he “deeply regrets,” the post-conviction support - the judgment displayed is difficult to reconcile with positions he held. The Deripaska episode suggested willingness to blur boundaries between public duty and private relationships with wealthy, controversial foreign figures. The Epstein affair confirms it.

Security vetting exists for reasons. When political expediency overrides intelligence assessment, the system has failed. Whether that failure proves catastrophic or merely embarrassing depends on questions that may never receive public answers.

Jeffrey Epstein is dead. The network he built, the intelligence he gathered, the compromising material he accumulated did not die with him. If British government secrets passed through his hands to foreign powers during acute national vulnerability, the damage may be incalculable.

That possibility should trouble anyone who takes national security seriously. Regardless of what the police investigation ultimately concludes.