The UK armed forces bill 2026

Bottom Line Upfront: The UK Armed Forces Bill may inflate the size of our forces on paper, but it does little to deter our adversaries. It is, in effect, political signalling that fails to confront the deep‑rooted issues undermining our ability to recruit and retain a credible fighting force.

In early January the Government quietly announced plans to make it easier to call up reservists for war by increasing the length of time reservists remain ‘on call’ and by reducing the threshold required for call up. The proposed changes under the UK’s Armed Forces Bill means that reservists could be mobilised up to the age of 65 – an increase in ten years from the current age limit of 55 – and when the UK requires “warlike preparations” - a change of wording from situations of “national danger, great emergency or attack in the UK.” It is expected to bolster the ‘on paper’ strength of the UK Armed Forces by circa 100,000 troops.

The bill also supposedly makes it easier for soldiers, sailors and airmen and women to have more flexible militaries careers, zigzagging in and out of service – a change that is hoped will attract more people to join up, further swelling the size of the UK Armed Forces.

These changes are unfolding against a backdrop of mounting security concerns, driven by an increasingly assertive Russia and escalating geopolitical tensions among major powers. They also coincide with strained US relations with NATO allies over claims to Greenland, as well as with long‑standing challenges posed by China, Venezuela and Iran.

The UK’s Strategic Reserve

The changes to reservist call up affect the UK’s Strategic Reserve force, but what is the Strategic Reserve? First off, the UK Armed Forces – the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force – all consist of both Regular and Regular Reserve armed forces personnel. Regular personnel are those that are employed full-time by the UK Armed Forces, and in the case of the Regular Reserve, these are volunteers who are employed for a specific part-time commitment.

Outside of these engagement types you have a pool of ex-service men and women in civil society who make up the Strategic Reserve, including myself. Whilst distinct from the Regular Reserve force, these are individuals that have previously served in the UK’s armed forces either as a Regular or Regular Reservist and therefore have undergone military training at some point or other – a useful army of ex-military folk who could plug workforce gaps in times of need. The UK Armed Forces are able to call upon this Strategic Reserve through a liability written into the contract of those who have served their country.

The UK has a long history, dating back over 100 years of utilising a reserve force – including the Strategic Reserve – to bolster the ranks. This has been the case particularly in times of war, where reservists were traditionally called back to provide resilience by plugging gaps in the regular force. And whilst it was never a perfect solution, it proved a reasonable course of action in times of fiscal hardship and delivered success in large-scale warfare such as the Invasion of Iraq in 2003 and in deterring our adversaries in the Cold War.

Reservists have also proved useful throughout recent history in supporting the military contribution to natural disasters, terrorist activity, health epidemics, protecting critical national infrastructure and providing homeland defence and resilience. But whilst the UK’s reserve force has been crucial to national security in the past, certain challenges threaten its effectiveness in 2026 and beyond.

Why Change Now?

Already alluded to are rising global geopolitical tensions which have the potential to pose an existential threat to the UK – increasing the pool of eligible combatants serves to superficially bolster the UK’s defensive force should it be required to protect the homeland. Part of the thinking here is that such a sizeable force on paper would deter our enemies and adversaries from engaging us in conflict. This comes at a time when the British Army is its smallest since the Napoleonic Wars, over 200 years ago, with just over 70,000 full-time, fully trained troops.

The British Army is at its smallest size since the Napoleonic Wars. Source: What size are the UK’s armed forces? – Full Fact

The change is also in line with our NATO allies who have for the most part made moves to raise the size of their armed forces, increase reserve force capacity and enhance combat readiness. Both Italy and Germany have proposed plans to bring back national service as a means of increasing their force sizes and in the case of the former, an expanded reserve force comprising skilled technicians in engineering and cybersecurity is already in the offing.

The Challenges

However, whilst the intent is evident, I contend that the UK Armed Forces Bill mainly serves as political gesturing – to appease a UK populace that has grown tired of the incumbent government – rather than providing tangible military deterrence. At play are a number of factors that undermine the UK military’s ability to raise and manage such a force, rendering the initiative flawed. Firstly, the MOD lacks any concrete method to mobilise the Strategic Reserve as a result of historically lax tracking of service leavers. Therefore, the MOD only has a limited understanding of which individuals comprise the Strategic Reserve, where they live, how to contact them, their skill set and importantly their suitability to serve in the UK Armed Forces.

Underlying this procedural challenge is a more fundamental problem – the UK’s declining patriotism. A study by Ipsos in 2025 found that only a third (35%) of Britons would take up arms for their country, down from 44% in 2022, highlighting the declining patriotism amongst Britain’s citizens. The increasingly common accusation of racism in society for flying the union flag or the St George’s Cross illustrate the flailing sense of national identity and makes you think – how do you recall citizens to defend their nation when they don’t see it worth defending?

Even if the MOD was able to locate circa 100,000 veterans, and even if they reported for duty, the UK’s Armed Forces would struggle to equip the Strategic Reserve. Our concerns that there would be a lack of equipment and munitions should the UK mobilise its reserve forces were echoed in 2024 by Lieutenant General Sir Rob Magowan who said that the UK could not sustain a fight against Russia for more than two months. More recently the 2025 UK Strategic Defence Review stated that the UK was inadequately prepared for modern warfare. On top of this we know that munition stockpiles are dangerously low and air defences grossly deficient which realistically means our Strategic Reserve force would be largely ineffectual in its present form.

But let’s be optimistic. If, in the event of war, the Strategic Reserve could be effectively mobilised, mustered with a force genuinely motivated to defend the homeland, and was properly equipped to do so — would it truly constitute a credible fighting force? Unfortunately, the short answer is no. Last year Prime Minister Kier Starmer said in a speech that the UK risked becoming an “island of strangers” in the face of uncontrolled illegal migration. These remarks point to a societal cohesion problem where large segments of the UK’s population, according to PM Starmer, do not share a common perception of what Britain is or whether it’s worth defending. In supporting this perspective, we see a fragmentation of societal cohesion in the UK along party lines, with a poll in late 2025 finding that over 60% of Conservative voters accepted higher taxes for more defence spending and nearly 70% supported the reintroduction of national service. This contrasted with 42% and less than 30% for Labour voters respectively. I contend that this sentiment diffuses into the military from civil society, where military cohesion depends on shared identity, common cause and mutual trust, ultimately undermining the fighting force’s cohesion and credibility on the battlefield.

Compounding the problem, even with a larger pool of veterans enabled by raising the maximum recall age and easing mobilisation rules, any notional increase in the Strategic Reserve is likely to be offset by the military’s persistent retention challenges. The UK Armed Forces have consistently missed yearly recruitment targets and in the past 25 years there have only been 6 years where the inflow of personnel has been above outflow. This gradual decline in the size of the overall fighting force will in the short-term boost the pool from which the Strategic Reserve can be drawn, but the Regular force’s longer-term demise will ultimately shrink the Strategic Reserve force.

Annual joiners and leavers of the UK regular forces, 2012/13 to 2024/25. Source: Size of the UK armed forces - House of Lords Library

The Bottom Line

Overall, the Government’s announcement to enlarge the size of the UK’s Strategic Reserve signals the right intent to bring on a ‘whole of society’ approach to defence and resilience. However, the move functions largely as political signalling rather than offering any meaningful military deterrence. Ministers will insist that they have addressed a resilience gap amid an existential threat from Eastern Europe, but this conveniently sidesteps the fundamental issues: why are we unable to recruit and retain a credible fighting force? Why are so few Britons willing to serve? And why is the country itself so fractured and bereft of cohesion? The underlying answers are deeply uncomfortable, reflecting decades of cumulative policy decisions from both governing parties, and it remains far easier to conjure a paper army than to resolve these systemic issues.

So, therefore, my response to the Bill is this: you cannot recall what you cannot locate; you cannot mobilise citizens who don’t identify with the nation; you cannot fight wars without ammunition; and you cannot reverse engineer patriotism after spending decades deconstructing it.

But all is not lost. Quick gains can be made by overhauling how veterans are tracked, a basic requirement for mobilising the Strategic Reserve. Secondly, equipment shortfalls may lessen as the intent of the Strategic Defence Review comes to fruition and defence investment grows with six new munitions and energetics factories coming online. However, the real test will be rebuilding British patriotism so the armed forces can once again field a credible fighting force – a challenge that demands genuine intent from government, and the willingness to take the first step.

References

A third of Britons – higher among men and young people - would take up arms for country, as confidence in armed forces to defend Britain from attack falls since 2022 | Ipsos

What size are the UK’s armed forces? – Full Fact

YouGov Study of War: Britons on serving in the armed forces | YouGov

Defence Poll October 2025